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Abstract 
 
This paper offers a selected review of strategic group theory and seeks to explore the 
benefits and limitations of modern strategic group analysis within the context of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry. The rise and fall of strategic group research is reviewed and 
some suggestions advanced as to the reasons why strategic group research has often 
produced conflicting results, particularly with regard to the link between group 
membership and performance. The review concludes that strategic group research 
continues to offer a valuable way to classify firms by their strategy and provides some 
suggestions as to how future studies may avoid the pitfalls exposed by previous 
research.  
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Introduction 
 
Classification or the grouping of items into categories based on their similarity is an 
enduring human trait and one that perhaps explains some of the attraction of strategic 
group theory. This theory, began with an observation in 1972 [1], that occupied a 
central theme in strategic group literature throughout the following two decades but 
which enjoys less popularity today. Why then did strategic group theory fall from 
grace and is the concept still of value today? 
This paper offers a selected review of strategic group theory and seeks to explain the 
benefits and limitations of modern strategic group analysis within the context of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry. A medium sized but highly profitable industry noted for its 
investment in research and product differentiation [2]that has been the focus of a 
number of strategic group studies [3-9]. Here, is an industry where given the long lead 
times and risks taken strategy should matter. Therefore if strategic group membership 
does indeed confer performance differences these should be visible within the pattern 
of strategic activity conducted by Pharmaceutical firms. 
 
The Rise and Fall of Strategic Group Theory. 
 
The idea of strategic groups began with the observation by Hunt that groups of firms 
pursuing different strategies were present in the US White Goods Industry [1]. This 
observation was interesting because it was contrary to existing industrial organisation 
[IO] theory, which proposed that for a given industry, there was an optimal strategy 
that all firms would pursue and where the only significant difference between firms 
was the relative application of scale [10, 11]. Strategic group theory therefore, offered 
 3
both a new line of enquiry and the opportunity to disprove the structure conduct 
performance paradigm. This perhaps was one of the reasons why strategic group 
theory diffused so rapidly into current strategy thinking. In addition, strategic group 
theory appealed to our natural taxonomic tendencies offering IO scholars the means to 
deconstruct industries and strategic management scholars the opportunity to compare 
groups of firms in terms of their strategies. In fact, the most popular definition of 
strategic groups, reiterates this view. “A strategic group is the group of firms in an 
industry following the same or a similar strategy along the strategic dimensions” [12]. 
With the discovery of strategic groups, research basically headed in two directions 
either in search of theory to explain the phenomenon or to prove the existence of 
strategic groups empirically within a variety of industries. Search for theory resulted 
in not one but two complementary theories, that underpin strategic group theory to the 
present day. The first of these “twin pillars” addresses the question of how different 
strategic group strategies can profitably persist within an industry setting, without 
being eroded away through firms invading the strategic group from outside [13]. By 
borrowing an idea from IO economics, strategic groups are portrayed as a series of 
walled enclaves resembling medieval fortress cities where intra-industry bulwarks or 
mobility barriers act to prevent entry from competitors. These were originally thought 
to arise as a result of joint investments by member companies’ that through their 
collective actions raised barriers to competition through investment in joint 
advertising or research, leading to higher profits through differentiation. To date, 
empirical research supports the existence of such mobility barriers [14] but evidence 
of the proposed mechanism is lacking. In reality however, does it really matter if 
mobility barriers are built through collective action or simply as the above definition 
suggests [12] through firms pursuing effectively similar strategies where a leading 
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group member may act as a reference point [15] or benchmark leading to mimicry? 
The end result is an effective mobility barrier, such as large sales forces mopping up 
available doctor appointments in the Pharmaceutical Industry that could result from 
either mechanism.  
The implications of mobility barriers are threefold. Firstly, that a hierarchy of 
strategic groups may exist, where strategic groups of higher profit potential are 
protected by higher mobility barriers. This leads to the suggestion that an evolutionary 
pathway may exist across an industry, with firms entering the industry where barriers 
are lowest before gaining experience and developing competences, which allows 
successful assault on the next most advantageous industry position. Second is the idea 
that environmental changes will not affect all strategic groups equally due to their 
differing levels of protection. Thirdly, that many of the factors that render imitation 
difficult are tacit in nature or due primarily to proprietary information [16]. Here the 
links to the resource-based view of the firm [17-20] are clearly apparent and it has 
been suggested that lack of mobility between groups is due more to firms history and 
their individual accumulated asset base then to cumulative mutual investments [21]. 
In summary, strategic groups have been shown to be stable intra-industry structures 
[3, 5, 22, 23] that are intrinsically linked to mobility barriers. Here, some researchers 
define strategic groups principally in terms of mobility barriers [12, 14]. Mascarenhas 
for example, remarks that mobility barriers are the core of the strategic group concept 
and defines strategic groups as “a grouping of businesses within an industry that is 
separated from other groupings of businesses by mobility barriers, barriers to entry 
and exit” [14]. 
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The second pillar of strategic group theory is the theory of intra-industry competition 
[24] which again borrows heavily from the SCP paradigm suggesting that relative size 
of firms acts to either encourage collusion or lead to greater rivalry. Here, Porter 
suggests that firms of similar size whose fortunes are closely intertwined through 
addressing common markets in the same type of way are far less likely to compete 
away their profits through internecine rivalry than firms who offer closely related or 
substitute products but compete on markedly different bases. Unlike mobility barrier 
theory that has been substantially supported by empirical work, the idea that strategic 
group membership has performance implications has met with mixed results. Some 
researchers claiming to uncover a performance difference between groups [3, 23, 25, 
26] others failing to find it [6, 27]. Conflicting results, taken by some researchers to 
imply that strategic groups did not exist and were an ephemeral concept, a result of 
faulty methods of detection, rather than naturally occurring intra-industry structures 
[28-30]. This a reference to the frequent use of clustering algorithms to identify 
groups and the ad hoc, frequently rule of thumb methods, used to select variables with 
which to define them  
Therefore, based upon these two complementary theories, strategic groups may be 
described as “stable intra-industry structures” separated by mobility barriers in pursuit 
of different strategies that may be expected to yield significant performance 
differences in terms of outcome. More recently it has been suggested that group 
cohesion is a third necessary parameter for strategic groups where it is argued that 
natural strategic groups should exhibit a cohesive group identity and evidence of 
interdependence. This leads, for example to strong differentiation through co-
operative advertising or joint research projects leading to knowledge asymmetries, 
which is a necessary condition for tenable strategic groups to exist [31]. 
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In conclusion, the strategic group concept achieved rapid acceptance because it 
challenged accepted theory and offered both IO and strategic management scholars a 
different lens through which to work. The promise of a relationship between strategic 
choice and performance was intrinsically attractive to strategic management 
researchers. To date however, the link between performance and strategic group 
membership has not been conclusively proven empirically. In the next section the 
possible reasons for a lack of consistent results are discussed. 
 
Why have consistent results not been obtained? 
 
One reason for the lack of consistency between the results of empirical studies is 
perhaps due to the different perspective taken by IO and strategic management 
researchers. The approach taken by the industrial organization researchers owes much 
to the SCP paradigm and can be summarized as short -term multi industry studies 
with often one and certainly no more than a handful of variables used to identify 
strategic groups. Here the work of Porter may be taken as a typical example where 
firms from 43 consumer industries were divided into two strategic groups of leaders 
or followers based on size which, was the sole variable used as a proxy for strategy 
[32]. In contrast the majority of strategic management studies focused upon one 
industry, often encompassed a number of years and adopted a multivariate approach 
with a number of variables frequently being used to describe scope resource and scale 
commitments [3, 5, 6]. Thus the coarse-grained cross industry approach of IO 
research is in stark contrast to the fine-grained strategic management approach and the 
incompatibility of these two approaches provides one possible explanation for a lack 
of consistent results, particularly within the early studies. Here the idea of strategy 
being industry specific or comparable across industries is a key point. It is argued that 
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strategy represents a pattern of choices those activities that you choose to pursue as 
against the myriad of options you discard [33]. This implies that strategies are context 
specific, as choice will always be bounded by, available resources, the competitive 
position, management attitude to risk and industry structure.  Therefore to compare 
across industries and to attempt to classify firm strategies at this level is likely at best 
to distinguish only very broad differences between firms’ approaches to strategy 
distinguishing perhaps between “generic strategies” [12] but not actual strategies. 
This practice of comparing at too broad a level may result in the subtleties of strategy 
that lead to performance differences between firms, perhaps being missed and if we 
accept that strategic choice is context specific then the most appropriate level for 
strategic group research is the industry. 
The second probable cause of a lack of agreement between studies is the almost 
universal lack of agreement as to choice of variables where even between studies 
seeking to investigate similar strategic dimensions for example scope or resource 
commitments there is little if any congruence of choice [3, 6]. A point illustrated in 
table 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
ABOUT HERE 
 
This table compares the variables used to describe strategy in two strategic group 
studies centred on the Pharmaceutical Industry [3, 6]. Two studies that attempt to 
describe strategy in terms of scale, scope and resource commitments and adopt a very 
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similar method. Both studies use Ward’s cluster analysis1 technique and measure 
performance based on market share and weighted market share2 but both achieve very 
different results. Cool studied strategic groups within the US Pharmaceutical market 
over a 20-year period and identified strategic groups using 15 variables [3] in contrast 
Marten’s identifies strategic groups within the Pharmaceutical Industry in 5 E.C. 
countries, over an 8-year period using only 6 variables [6]. Here it is interesting to 
note that there is little congruence between the actual variables chosen even when 
exploring a similar strategy dimension. For example, Marten’s describes breadth of 
focus based upon the firms’ top 2 therapeutic areas while Cool chose the top 3. Why 
the different choice of variables? Surely the Pharmaceutical Industry is a global 
industry where due to the high research costs of $700m per new chemical entity 
[NCE] in order to recoup costs before patent expiry firms are forced to market 
globally where cost of promotion adds a further $400m to effectively market the new 
product within all the world’s major markets [34]. In a global industry the key 
strategic choices must surely be common across national boundaries. Therefore a 
priority for strategic group research must be to identify the set of variables that 
accurately reflect strategic choice within that industry. This is critical to achieving 
comparable results, as one of the criticisms of strategic group research is over reliance 
on clustering techniques where the algorithm chosen will produce clusters but not 
distinguish between whether a no cluster solution is preferable to splitting the data 
[28]. Thus the researchers judgement is the determining factor to answer the question 
                                                 
1 Wards technique is an agglomerative hierarchical clustering method that forms clusters on the basis of 
minimising within group variance. 
2 Weighted market share recognises that some companies may choose to dominate a few selected 
market segments and is measured by the sum of firm sales in therapy class i divided by total firm sales 
and multiplied by firm sales of therapy class i divided by total market sales of therapy class i 6.
 Martens, R., Strategic Group Formation and Performance. The Case of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry in Five E.C. Countries  1978-1985, in Faculty of Applied Economics. 1988, UFSIA Antwerp 
University: Antwerp. p. 402. Page 249 
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as to whether the clusters obtained accurately reflect strategic choice within the 
industry. 
Porter suggests mapping strategic groups using the principle mobility barriers as 
variables as a simple and robust method of identifying strategic groups within an 
industry [12]. Here, for example mapping sales force expenditure against research 
spend has been shown to produce clear and relevant strategic groups within the 
Pharmaceutical Industry [35].This could perhaps be a useful exploratory step to 
describe the relationships within the data before employing a clustering technique to 
explore the strategic choice relationships in more detail. When employing any 
clustering technique however, it should be noted that “it is probably the choice of 
variables that has the greatest influence on the ultimate results of a cluster analysis” 
[36]. 
A third reason for lack of consistency may be due to the lack of consistent method 
within strategic group research. Research into the use of clustering techniques within 
strategic management points to a number of common flaws in method and found that 
only 7% of studies followed a robust procedure [37]. Here common errors include the 
use of only one clustering technique, where the recommendation is to use an 
agglomerative technique in conjunction with a divisive technique to check the 
consistency of the cluster obtained. In neither of the two pharmaceutical studies cited 
earlier was this procedure carried out. Cool used Wards method together with the 
complete linkage method, both of which are agglomerative techniques that essentially 
are very similar. Ward minimises variance within groups while complete linkage 
maximises the distance between the most dissimilar members of adjacent clusters. 
Marten’s employed only Wards technique. The second common error is to include 
variables that are strongly correlated within the data set this has the effect of 
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strengthening the influence of these variables in comparison to the remaining 
variables and therefore may skew the result obtained. In the two studies used as our 
example, both include total sales that may be expected to correlate strongly with the 
FOCUS variable that measures the proportion of sales from the top 2 or three 
therapeutic groups. The inclusion of total sales, which has been has commonly 
included in strategic group research, may be questioned on two grounds. First, sales is 
an outcome not a strategic choice variable although it can be argued that many 
decisions, such as how much to spend on research, may be scale dependent. Second, 
in attempting to measure performance between groups in terms of market share, 
separating groups on the basis of size may appear tautological.  
To conclude, the lack of consistent performance results may be at least partially 
explained through a lack of a consistent reproducible method, the contrasting 
perspectives taken between the IO and strategic management researchers, and the lack 
of a consistent set of variables used to operationalised strategy even in similar studies 
looking to explore strategic groups within the same industry. 
 
Do natural strategic groups clusters exist? Evidence from the Pharmaceutical 
Industry. 
 
Much of the criticism leveled against the strategic group concept stems from criticism 
of the method particularly the application of clustering techniques to separate strategic 
groups based on a selection of quantitative variables. Support for the existence of 
strategic groups is found in cognitive studies which rather than measuring post hoc 
decision variables employ interview techniques to ascertain intended strategic action. 
Here, research conducted in a number of different industries identified cognitive 
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groupings broadly equivalent to strategic groups, which supports the conclusion that 
strategic groups or relatively stable intra-industry structures do exist. Here managers 
“mental models” define both the competitive arena in terms of what companies 
represent close rivals and what the accepted “rules of engagement” or ways to 
compete are [38, 39]. Of course cognitive studies are not without flaws and it is worth 
noting that the limited number of observations on which these studies are based and 
the sensitivity of results to participant selection should be taken into account. 
Evidence from cognitive studies does however support the presence of intra-industry 
groupings whether defined on the basis of ante hoc strategic intent or post hoc 
strategic action. 
Particularly compelling evidence comes from the Pharmaceutical Industry where the 
findings of a number of long-term strategic group studies utilizing cluster analysis to 
identify groups [3, 6, 9, 21, 26] have been supported by cognitive studies that point to 
the consistent presence of strategic groups [8, 9]. For example Osborne studying 
thematic groups within the US Pharmaceutical Industry extracted themes of strategic 
intent from annual reports for pharmaceutical companies between 1963 and 1982 
identifying the presence of intra-industry groups similar to those reported by Cool [8]. 
In effect this study cross checks the findings of Cool’s 1985 study over the same 
period through employing a very different method. It is compelling evidence in favour 
of strategic groups within the Pharmaceutical Industry that the earlier findings of Cool 
are broadly reproducible by a different method.  
In conclusion, despite concerns that strategic groups may be a mere artifact of method 
[28], evidence from the pharmaceutical industry suggests a relatively stable intra-
industry structure measured consistently in studies of up to 20-years duration [3, 5, 
 12
21, 26]. Presence supported by and strongly correlated with more recent cognitive 
research [8, 9].  
The issue of a link between strategic group membership and performance however 
still remains to be clarified where the Pharmaceutical Industry offers an interesting 
avenue for research. If we consider that the Pharmaceutical Industry is consistently 
one of the highest performing industries in the world [40] where given the enormous 
costs of research and the high degree of risk, strategy should link to performance. 
Therefore if strategic group analysis provides an accurate classification of strategic 
choice there should by definition be a performance difference between strategic 
groups. Certainly the stock market values companies with similar asset stocks 
differently quoting reference to previous results and the experience of the 
management [2, 41].  
In contrast an examination of empirical strategic group research within the 
pharmaceutical industry reveals conflicting results, some studies reporting significant 
performance differences between groups [9, 26, 42], others finding no significant 
performance difference between strategic groups [7] [21]. To explain these 
differences the fact that none of the studies cited employed a common set of variables 
is one cause. A second possible cause may be the lack of a consistent reproducible 
method to differentiate groups. Finally what constitutes performance is a thorny issue 
and with the exception of the studies by Cool and Martens each researcher has chosen 
different performance variables to measure. 
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Conclusions. 
 
Strategic group research offers the opportunity to classify strategy within a given 
industry that in turn, provides the base for the testing of theories related to strategic 
choice between strategic groups. To accurately reflect strategic choice the first critical 
choice is the set of variables, which should be industry specific and describe sufficient 
dimensions to represent the pattern of strategic activity within the industry. It is 
important to realize that to obtain comparable results between strategic group studies 
it is necessary to describe strategic groups on similar terms. Therefore, for each 
industry research should attempt to identify the set of variables that best describe 
strategic choice within that industry and to incorporate as much as possible the 
variables used in previous research to aid comparison. 
In the critical choice of variables, the clarity of the cluster solution may be 
compromised if too many variables are included therefore it is important to 
understand the relationship between the variables and develop a prior theory as to 
why those particular strategic choices are important and how they would link to 
performance. Here the advice of Porter to choose variables that represent key mobility 
barriers is useful and this approach has been employed to identify strategic groups 
within the UK pharmaceutical industry [35]. The aim should be to replicate clear 
strategic action by carefully selecting the right strategic choices from the myriad of 
possible options. The selection of variables should therefore be parsimonious and 
based upon prior theory but not so restrictive as to fail to accurately represent the 
pattern of strategic choice within the given industry. 
Thirty years on, the promise of strategic group research to provide a robust theoretical 
taxonomy of industry strategy is still valid. A classification system that is useful to 
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separate firms into meaningful groups as a basis for further research or as a means to 
make sense of and map industry dynamics over time. Here, a useful application for 
industry managers is to spot future viable market positions and chart company 
strategy toward them or to explore the possible future competitor moves by examining 
the implications of the unoccupied spaces on a strategic group map [43].  
In fact, one of the problems of modern competitive analysis is how to cope with the 
increasingly diverse and rich data available for analysis and turn it into actionable 
information. The application of strategic mapping techniques to clarify the 
relationship between various data sources may be invaluable for this purpose. 
Within strategic group research the more recent emphasis has been upon the resource- 
based view of the firm [17-20] the view that what we are determines what we can do. 
This approach is in many ways complimentary to and not contradictory to strategic 
group theory because the detailed history of a firm in many ways shapes strategic 
investments which, is what is primarily captured through strategic group analysis. The 
life-blood of a taxonomic system is the data to classify cases and here the rich 
description of asset stocks and strategic choices emanating from the resource-based 
perspective may provide useful complements to strategic groups, particularly when 
attempting to explain differences within groups. Here, some of the earlier strategic 
group research appears complementary to this view. For example, the relationship 
between asset stocks and performance [44, 45], or the relationship between risk and 
performance [42]. 
In conclusion the strategic group concept is an idea that appealed to both strategic 
management and industrial organization researchers because it offered a new 
perspective on industry structure and competitive strategy. Differences in perspective, 
that to some extent set the seeds for much of the conflicting evidence from early 
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research. The ability to classify and compare firms in terms of their strategies does 
however have an intrinsic appeal to strategic management researchers but in order to 
capitalize upon the promise of strategic group research it is important to work from 
sound foundations.  
The guidelines suggested by a selective examination of past research are as follows. 
Firstly, the variables chosen to represent strategy should be industry specific and a 
sound theoretical reason given for inclusion and exclusion. Secondly, wherever 
possible research should take previous research as a start point for variable selection, 
this should encourage the development of industry specific comprehensive data sets 
that represent strategic choice in that industry. Thirdly, to explore the relationships 
between variables strategic mapping is to be recommended this also acts as a cross 
check against multicollinearity. Fourthly if cluster analyses are to be employed the 
data sets should be standardized to remove the scale effects, or a scale independent 
method selected and two cluster analyses should be conducted employing both 
agglomerative and divisive methods to cross check the result. Finally the research will 
benefit from a sound theoretical premise prior to the analysis as to what the groups 
represent. This should suggest the correct set of performance variables to test the 
posited relationship, which should be comprehensive so as to explore the relationship 
but also parsimonious so as not to include spurious results. 
Thus the application of sound industry specific strategic group research offers a 
valuable means to classify and make sense of competitive dynamics. This is 
complementary to ongoing strategic management research and equally useful to 
practicing managers wishing to understand and anticipate the strategic moves of their 
competitors. 
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______________________________ 
TABLE 1      VARIABLES SELECTED 
 
 
Strategic Group Variables Cool (1985) Strategic Group Variables Martens (1988) 
   NB: All Marten’s variables refer to 4 year totals 
Rx % prescription [Rx] sales in total 
domestic drug sales 
 PROXIMITY 
DRUGST % drug store sales in total domestic drug 
sales 
  
The rank order of the cluster to which the firm belongs, 
derived from a cluster analysis on the basis of the 
percentage sales in each of the 12 therapeutic classes.  
  
BRANGEN % branded generic Rx sales in total 
domestic Rx sales 
    
COMMGEN % commodity generic sales in total 
domestic Rx sales 
    
MAINT % maintenance drug sales in total 
domestic Rx sales 
    
FOCUS (Rx sales in 3 largest therapeutic 
categories)/(total domestic Rx sales) 
FOCUS (Rx sales in 2 largest therapeutic categories)/(total firm 
sales) 
FOREIGN % total firm sales generated abroad GEOG (Max of sales of firm in one of the five countries)/(total 
firm sales) 
RDS (total firm R&D)/(Worldwide health 
care sales) 
    
RDEFFS (No of NDAs submitted)/(No of INDs)     
RDORIENT (NCEs approved/NCEs submitted)     
PRODSTR (No of NCEs)/(Total No of New 
Products) 
INNOVATE (Sales of products less than 2 years old)/(Total firm 
sales) 
PROFPROM (total domestic professional promotion)/ 
(total domestic Rx sales) 
PROMOTION (Total promotion) / (Number of products introduced in 
the last 2 years) 
CONSADV (total domestic consumer promotion) / 
(total domestic Rx sales) 
    
DISTR % of total domestic drug sales shipped 
directly to drug stores and hospitals 
    
SIZE LN (Total domestic drug sales) LOYALTY LN (Total domestic drug sales) 
    
 
